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I. STATEl\ffiNT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a workers' compensation case. Employer and Surety appeal with permission from 
the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed March 26, 
2018, and from the Commission's Order Denying Request for Reconsideration filed May 23, 2018. 
Employer and Surety challenge the Commission's determination that: (1) Idaho Code § 72-806 
required that Surety issue a written notice of change of status when it made the last payment to 
Claimant of income benefits due against his permanent impairment rating of 11 % whole person; 
(2) the statute of limitation under Idaho Code § 72-706(3) was tolled through operation of Idaho 
Code § 72-604; and (3) Claimant's Complaint for additional income benefits was, as a result, 
timely filed. Employer and Surety contend the Commission committed reversible error on three 
grounds. First, a Section 72-806 notice of change of status is not required when a surety makes 
the final payment of income benefits for a permanent impairment rating. Second, even if the 
Commission correctly concluded that a Section 72-806 notice was required, the failure of Surety 
to issue a written notice of change of statute when it made the last payment of income benefits for 
Claimant's permanent impairment rating did not automatically constitute a "willful" act for 
purposes of the tolling provision of Idaho Code § 72-604. Third, the Commission failed to apply 
a "substantial compliance" standard as regarding the issue of whether there was a legally sufficient 
excuse under Idaho Code§ 72-604 for Surety's failure to issue a Section 72-806 notice. Employer 
and Surety seek reversal of the Commission. They request that the Court enter an order that 
Claimant's Complaint was not timely filed and that his Complaint is barred by Idaho Code§ 72-
706(3). 
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B. Course of the Proceedings 
Claimant's accident and injury occurred on November 20, 2008. R., p. 83. Surety issued 
the final payment of income benefits to Claimant in care of his attorney on June 22, 2015. R., p.84. 
On July 22, 2016, Claimant's attorney filed a Complaint with the Industrial Commission for further 
income benefits. R., pp. 1-3. On July 26, 2016, Employer and Surety filed their Answer. R., pp. 4-
5. Employer and Surety raised as one of their defenses the one-year limitation provision of Idaho 
Code 72-706(3) regarding the time for filing an application for additional income benefits when 
income benefits have been discontinued more than four years after the date of accident. R., p. 5; 
R. p. 27. 
The Parties submitted to the Commission for resolution .. [t]he sole issue" of "whether 
Claimant's complaint was timely filed under Idaho Code §72-706(3) so as to preserve his asserted 
claim for additional payment of non-medical indemnity benefits." R., p. 82. The Commission 
referred the matter to Referee Brian Harper. R., p. 81 . The record before the Referee and the 
Commission consisted of stipulated facts, joint exhibits A through H, Defendants' Exhibit 1, 
Exhibit A to Defendants' Motion for Judicial Notice of Publication of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, and the briefing by the Parties. R., p. 82. The matter came under advisement on 
August 31, 2017. R., p. 81. While the matter was under advisement, the Parties requested that a 
decision be held in abeyance to permit settlement negotiations. R., p. 81. Proceedings were then 
suspended. R., p. 81. On February 28, 2018, Employer and Surety requested resumption of 
proceedings and issuance of a decision. R., p. 81. 
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On March 8, 2018, Referee Harper submitted to the Commission his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. 1 R., p. 81. Referee Harper recommended that the 
Commission conclude that Claimant's Complaint was barred by Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) because 
it was not filed within one year from the date of the last payment of income benefits. Harper, 
Findings, etc., pp. 18-19. The Commission chose not to adopt Referee Harper's recommendation. 
R., p. 81. Instead, the Commission on March 26, 2018 filed its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order. R., p. 81. The Commission concluded that: (1) Idaho Code §72-806 required 
Defendants to provide Claimant with written notice that payments of PPD benefits for PPI had 
ceased; (2) the failure to provide such written notice tolled the Idaho Code §72-706(3) statute of 
limitation because of the operation of Idaho Code §72-604; and (3) Claimant's Complaint, 
therefore, was timely. R., p. 96. 
Employer and Surety filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supporting Memorandum on 
April 6, 2018. R., pp. 98-115. Claimant filed his Objection on April 2018. R., pp. 116-122. The 
Commission on May 23, 2018 filed its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. R., pp. 130-
134. On June 5, 2018, Employer and Surety filed with the Commission their Rule 12, I.A.R, 
Motion for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, and Supporting Memorandum. R., pp. 135-
148. On June 21, 2018, Claimant filed his Objection. R. pp. 149-152. The Commission on June 
25, 2018 filed its Order Granting Permissive Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 12. R., pp. 153-155. On 
July 3, 2018, Employer and Surety filed with this Court their Motion for Acceptance of Appeal by 
Permission and Supporting Memorandum. On or about July 17, 2018, Claimant filed with the 
Court his Response. On July 30, 2018, the Court issued its Order Granting Motion for Acceptance 
1 Referee Harper's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation is part of the Agency 
Record on Appeal. It is listed in the Agency Record at p. i. as Item No. 4 under "Additional Documents" in the 
Agency Record "Exhibits List." 
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of Appeal by Permission. On August 16, 2018, Employer and Surety filed with the Commission 
their Notice of Appeal. R., pp. 156-160. The Commission issued its Order Settling Record on 
October 25, 2018. R., 161-163. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
The following numbered facts were set out by the Commission at pages 3-5 of its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. R., pp. 83-85. The Commission took those facts "from 
the parties' Stipulated Facts." R., p. 83. 
1. Claimant Brent Austin was injured in the course of his employment with Defendant 
Employer Bio Tech Nutrients on November 20, 2008. 
2. Defendants provided Claimant with medical treatment from November 21, 2008, 
through June 20, 2014. 
3. Claimant experienced no time loss with respect to his November 20, 2008, injury 
until June 4, 2012. 
4. Defendants paid temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits to Claimant for the 
period June 9, 2012 through July 18, 2014. 
5. Claimant was determined by independent medical evaluation to be at maximum 
medical improvement on June 20, 2014. 
6. Defendants advised Claimant by Notice of Claim Status ("NOCS") dated July 18, 
2014, that his TTD benefits would stop effective July 18, 2014, based on Dr. Fellars' determination 
that Claimant was at maximum medical improvement on June 20, 2014. Joint Exhibit A. 
7. Additionally, the July 18, 2014, NOCS explained that Dr. Fellars rated Claimant's 
permanent partial impairment ("PPf') at 11 % of the whole person and that Claimant would be paid 
$18,694.50 in bi-weekly installments based on $339.90 per week beginning August 1, 2014, until 
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the award was paid in full. Joint Exhibit A. 
8. Defendants attached a copy of Dr. Fellars' June 20, 2014, medical report to the July 
18, 2014, NOCS. Joint Exhibit A. 
9. Claimant's counsel requested a benefit payment summary from the Surety on 
October 31, 2014. The Surety mailed a summary of paid benefits that was received by Claimant 
on November 20, 2014. The summary included an itemization of PPI benefits paid by the Surety 
through the period ending November 21, 2014. A copy of the PPI payment portion of Surety's 
benefit summary is provided as Joint Exhibit B. 
10. Payment of Claimant's PPI benefits commenced on July 19, 2014, which is noted 
by the initial PPI benefit payment entry on Joint Exhibit B. 
11. A copy of Employer/Surety's Summary of Payments dated October 31, 2014, filed 
with the Commission on November 4, 2014, and approved by the Commission on January 7, 2015, 
is provides as Joint Exhibit C. 
12. Defendants issued the final payment of PPI to Claimant in care of his attorney on 
June 22, 2015, by check number 270024820 in the amount of $2,379.30. See Joint Exhibit D. 
13. The remittance advice attached to check number 270024820 stated a payment 
description of "Permanent Partial Scheduled/Impairment" and a comment of "PPI Final Payment." 
See Joint Exhibit D. 
14. Check number 270024820, issued June 22, 2015, cleared Defendant Surety's bank 
on July 10, 2015. 
15. In the months of June and/or July 2015, Defendant Surety did not send to Claimant 
nor file with the Commission any NOCS (IC Form 8) regarding Claimant's PPI benefits. 
16. In the months of June and/or July 2015, Defendant Surety did not send to Claimant 
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or Claimant's counsel any written notice regarding Claimant's PPI benefits other than the 
remittance advice attached to check number 270024820 dated June 22, 2015. See Exhibit D. 
17. Claimant filed a complaint in this with the Commission on July 20, 2016. Joint 
Exhibit E. 
18. In his Complaint, Claimant raised the issue of additional TIO benefits and reserves 
issues of PPI and permanent partial disability ("PPD"). See Joint Exhibit E. 
19. In their Answer to Complaint filed with the Commission July 26, 2016, Defendants 
asserted the affirmative defense "that Claimant is barred by the statute of limitations of 72-706, 
Idaho Code, as to any indemnity benefits whatsoever." Joint Exhibit F. 
20. On September 6, 2016, Defendants provided Answer to Interrogatory No. 3. Joint 
Exhibit G. 
21. Claimant's counsel requested a record of NOCS filed with the Idaho Industrial 
Commission and, on April 24, 2017, received a report from the Idaho Industrial Commission titled 
"Change of Status Notices Received for Claim Number 2008-038504." Joint Exhibit H. 
The Commission reached the following four Conclusions of Law: 
1. Defendants were required to give Claimant written notice of the cessation of PPI benefits per 
Idaho Code §72-706; 
2. By operation of Idaho Code § 72-604, failure to give such written notice tolls the limitation 
provisions of Idaho Code §72-706; 
3. Claimant's complaint is timely; and 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive to all matters 
adjudicated. 
R., p. 95. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Commission err as a matter of law in determining that a Form 8 notice of 
change of status is required § 72-806 when income benefits for a pre-determined permanent 
impairment rating are paid in full? 
2. Did the Commission err as a matter of law in determining that Surety' s failure to 
issue a Section 72-806 Form 8 notice of change of statute automatically constituted a willful act 
for purposes of the tolling provision of Idaho Code § 72-604? 
3. Did the Commission err as a matter of law by failing to apply to the stipulated and 
uncontested facts a "substantial compliance" standard as a legally sufficient excuse for purposes 
of Idaho Code§ 72-604 regarding Surety's failure to issue a Section 72-806 notice? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an Industrial Commission decision, the Court exercises free review over 
questions of law. Izaquirre v. R & L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 231, 308 P.3d 
929,931 (2013). Whether the Commission applied the correct legal standard to its determination 
of factual issues is a question of law. Combes v. State, /11d11strial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 
Idaho 430, 432, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
This case involves two statues: Idaho Code§ 72-806 and Idaho Code§ 72-604. Idaho 
Code § 72- 806 states: 
A workman shall receive written notice within fifteen ( 15) days of any 
change of status or condition including, but not limited to, the denial, 
reduction or cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation 
benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level of compensation 
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benefits to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled. If any 
change in compensation benefits is based upon a medical report or 
medical reports from any physician or any other practitioner of the 
healing arts, a copy of such report shall be attached to the written notice 
which the workman shall receive. The industrial commission shall by 
rule and regulation, determine by whom the notice shall be given and the 
form for such notice. In the absence of a rule governing a particular 
situation, the employer's insurer, or in the case of self-insurers, the 
employer, shall be responsible for giving the notice required herein. 
Idaho Code § 72-604 states: 
When the employer has knowledge of an occupational disease, injury, or 
death and willfully fails or refuses to file the report as required by section 
72-602( 1 ), Idaho Code, the notice of change of status required by section 
72-806, Idaho Code, the limitations prescribed in section 72-701 and 
section 7-706, Idaho Code, shall not run against the claim of any person 
seeking compensation until such report or notice shall have been filed. 
IDAPA 17 .02.08.061 governs "NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE." The regulation provides as follows: 
01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 
72-806, a worker shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any 
change of statute or condition, including, but not limited to, whenever there is 
an acceptance, commencement, denial. Reduction, or cessation of medical or 
monetary compensation benefits to which the worker might presently or 
ultimately be entitled. Such notice is required when benefits are reduced to 
recoup any overpayment of benefits in accordance with the provisions of Section 
72-316. 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-
806, shall be given by the surety if the employer has secured Workers' 
Compensation Insurance, or by the employer if the employer is self-insured, or 
the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. 
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-
806 shall be mailed within ten ( 10) days by regular United States Mail to the 
last know address of the worker, as shown in the records of the party required 
to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given in a format 
substantially similar to IC Form 8, available from the Commission and posted 
on the Commission's website at www.iic.idaho.£O\ . 
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04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is 
based on a medical report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the 
report to the notice. 
OS. Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-
806, shall send a copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the 
employer, and the workers' attorney, if the worker is represented, at the same 
time notice is sent to the worker. The party giving notice may supply the copy 
to the Industrial Commission in accordance with the Commission's rule on 
electronic submission of documents. 
The Commission's Form 8 can be found at Idaho Industrial Commission, Find a Form, 
Adjuster Forms, Notice of Change of Status (IC - 8), hup~://iic.idaho.!!ov/find-a-form/. A copy 
of a Form 8 can also be found in the Agency Record at p. 3 la. That copy of the Form 8 a is part 
of the Commission's "Advanced Level Student Book" which the Commission took judicial notice 
of pursuant to Referee's Order Granting Motion for Judicial Notice of Publication of the Idaho 
Industrial Commission. R., pp. 73-74. The "Advanced Level Student Book" is used by the 
Commission's Claims and Benefits Department for its Certified Idaho Workers Compensation 
Specialist Learning Course. See R., p. 34. 
The Commission's Form 8 Notice of Claim Status contains boxes to be checked when 
"Your benefit payments will be" either "Reduced" or "Increased." It also requires that an 
"Effective Date" be provided for the reduction or increase and requires that the ''Reason" be 
given. Similarly, there is a box to be checked when "Your benefit payments will be stopped," 
and requirements for an "Effective Date" and the "Reason." 
One of Employer's and Surety's arguments in this appeal is that the Commission erred 
as a matter of law by failing to apply a "substantial compliance" legal standard to the 
undisputed facts to determine whether there was a lawful excuse for Surety's failure to file a 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 9 
Form 8 at the time Surety made the last payment of income benefits to Claimant for his 
permanent impairment rating. 
The relevant undisputed and stipulated facts bearing on the "substantial compliance" 
issue are as follows. The Defendant Surety initially issued a written Form 8 NOCS after receiving 
Dr. Fellars' PPI rating, and the Surety included a copy of Dr. Fellars' report with the NOCS. The 
NOCS specified that the rating was 11% whole person, which equated to a value of $18,694.50 
which would be paid at the rate of $339.90 per week, payable bi-weekly starting effective June 1, 
2014. By its terms, the NOCS was specifying that the benefits to be paid for the rating were fixed 
and finite-Le., the payments would end once the $18,604.50 had been fully paid. Additionally, 
Claimant was represented by counsel beginning in 2014. As noted in the Stipulation of Facts, 
Claimant's counsel requested from the Defendant Surety on October 31, 2014 a summary of 
benefit payments. The Surety provided the summary, and it was received on November 20, 
2014. It included an itemization of the PPI payments which had been made through the period 
ending November 21, 2014. The Surety made periodic payments after the initial NOCS was issued 
throughout the remainder of2014 and during 2015 until the rating was paid out. On June 22, 2015, 
the Surety issued a check payable to Claimant in care of his attorney. The payment amount was 
$2,379.30. The check also had a written "Statement" attached to it. The Statement is Joint Exhibit 
D and can be found in the Agency Record at p. 17. The Statement provided several of information 
besides the date of the check and its amount. The Statement instructed the recipient to 'DETACH 
AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT THE A TT ACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS 
DESCRIBED BELOW." The Statement indicated that the check in the amount of $2,379.30 was 
payment for the period from June 20, 2015 through July 3, 2015; that it was payment for 
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"Permanent Partial Scheduled/Impairment[;]" and it stated under the heading "Comment" that it 
was "PPI Final Payment." 
B. A Section 72-806 Notice of Change of Status is Not Required When Payment of 
Income Benefits for a Permanent Impairment Rating is Completed 
The Commission found in Finding 45 that a Section 72-806 notice was required because 
Claimant's "level" of benefits was "affected" by the last payment of the PPI rating. 2 Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, R., p. 94. The Commission's conclusion is in error because 
it fails to distinguish between a type of benefit which is fixed, such as permanent impairment (PPI), 
or permanent partial disability (PPD), and one that is not fixed, such as temporary total disability 
(TTD). PPI and PPD are based on evaluations which compute into fixed amounts for a known 
duration. See Idaho Code § 72-422 through § 72-430. For instance, Claimant's permanent 
impairment rating of 11 % whole person converted into a period of 55 weeks payable at a weekly 
rate of $339.90, resulting in a total benefit amount of $18,694.50. By contrast, a period of TTD 
cannot be predetermined because TTD is payable for total disability "during the period of 
recovery" from an injury or occupational disease. Idaho Code §72-408. 
Employer and Surety contend that legal analysis applied by the Referee in his proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommendations Commission of March 8, 2018, is the 
correct analysis. 
The Referee noted in the last sentence of Proposed Finding 41 that "The reality is that no 
notice was required under I.C. § 72-806 when the final installment payment was delivered to 
2 In its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission added the following comment regarding its 
conclusion the Idaho Code § 72-806 required a written notice of change of status when Surety made the final 
payment of Claimant's 11% of the whole person permanent impairment rating: "The March26,2018 Order outlines 
why the statutory scheme requires a NCOS when PPI benefits stop. The plain language of the statute treats the 
cessation or final payment of PPI benefits the same as other benefits, such as TTDs or medical benefits; therefore, 
the cessation of any of these benefits triggers the need for a NCOS from Defendants." R., p. 132. 
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Claimant." Harper, Findings, etc., p. 12. The Referee then went on in Proposed Findings 42-44 to 
explain why no notice was required. 
42. I.C. §72-806 requires an injured worker to receive written notice of any change 
of status which directly or indirectly affects the level of compensation benefits to 
which the worker might presently or ultimately be entitled. The term "affects" 
means to make a difference to, or alter, or to effect a change in. See, e.g., Black's 
Law Dictionary Fifth Ed. ( 1979), or various on-line dictionaries. 
43. In the context of the statute, changes of status which impact a claimant's level 
(amount) of compensation to which he or she will presently or ultimately receive 
require an NCOS. For example, when TTD payments come to an end, such a 
decision to cease those payments affects a claimant's level of compensation. When 
a pre-determined amount of benefits is calculated, such as PPI benefits, notice of 
such calculated amount to be paid must be provided to a claimant. In the present 
case that notice was sent. However, when the pre-determined benefits are paid in 
full, that in no way impacts the amount of compensation to which a claimant is 
entitled. Payment simply takes the benefits from prospective to actualized. 
44. Defendants herein had an obligation to provide Claimant with notice that he 
would receive a set sum correlated to his 11 % whole-person impairment, paid in 
installments. Defendants met that obligation with the NOCS sent to Claimant on 
July 18, 2014. The NOCS set forth the total amounts he would receive, and the fact 
that payment would be made in bi-weekly installments until paid in full. Making 
those payments did not change the level of compensation to which Claimant was 
entitled. 
Harper, Findings, etc., pp .. 12-13. 
The Referee went on in Proposed Finding 45 to address any alleged confusion concerning 
PPI payout dates, stating, in pertinent part, that "the allegedly confusing and conflicting PPI payout 
dates on which Claimant might receive his final PPI payment in no way implicates the necessity 
for an I.C. §72-806 notice. Any uncertainty was resolved when the final check, bearing the 
notation "'PPI Final Payment,"' was delivered." Harper, Findings, etc., p. 13. 
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The Commission in its Finding 45 stated that the "argument" that .. [t]he end was expected 
and nothing changed" regarding Claimant's PPI award "is not implausible." R., p. 94. The 
Commission noted as plausible Defendants' argument that "Claimant's entitlement to the PPI 
award was finite, ... [and] he was initially alerted to the fact that there would be an endpoint to 
the payment of those benefits." R., p. 94. Thus, "his level of compensation wasn't really affected 
when those payments came to an end." R., p. 94. Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that 
"while this argument is not implausible, there is no support for it in the plain language of the 
statute." R., p. 94. The Commission reasoned that "The level (amount) of money he periodically 
received was therefore "affected" by the receipt of the last payment, for Claimant received no 
further payments thereafter." R., p. 94. 
The difference between the Commission and the Referee is that the Referee looked at what 
the term "affects" practicaUy means as it relates to the "level" of benefits in the context of a pre-
determined finite amount of benefits when that amount is paid out. His was the correct 
construction of the statute. It is the construction which should be followed by the Court. 
Consequently, the Court should reverse the Commission's determination that a Section 74-806 
Form 8 Notice of Change of Status was required in the case. 
C. The Commission Erred as a Matter of Law by Determining that the Failure of Surety 
to File a Form 8 Notice of Change of Status Upon the Final Payment of Income 
Benefits to Claimant for His Permanent Impairment Rating Automatically 
Constituted a "Willful" Act for Purposes of the Tolling Provision of Idaho Code § 72-
604; and Committed Further Error by Failing to Apply a "Substantial Compliance" 
Standard as a Legally Sufficient Expense for Purposes of Idaho Code § 72-604 
Regarding Surety's Failure to Issue a Section 72-806 Notice. 
Even if the Court concludes the Commission was legally correct in interpreting Idaho Code 
§ 72-806 as requiring a notice of change of status when a permanent impairment rating is fully 
paid out, the Commission still committed reversible error in its determination that Surety's failure 
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to file a Form 8 notice when it issued final payment on the permanent impairment rating was 
"willful." 
This case presents a controlling question of law regarding the interpretation of the 
"willfully fails" requirement of Idaho Code § 72-604 in the context of a notice of change of status 
under Idaho Code § 72-806. More specifically, the essential issue is whether a surety's failure to 
issue a notice of change of status when the final payment is made of income benefits for permanent 
impairment is automatically a "willful failure" for purposes of the tolling provision of Idaho Code 
§ 72-604; or whether the failure to file a Form 8 notice of change of status under § 72-806 is 
excusable under § 72-604 when the surety has substantially complied with § 72-806 through the 
information contained on the Statement attached to the check for the last payment of income 
benefits for permanent impairment. 
There is no Idaho Supreme Court case construing "willful" for purposes of the tolling 
provision of Idaho Code § 72-604 in the context of the failure to issue an Idaho Code § 72-806 
notice of change of status when a PPI rating has been fully paid. 
The Commission in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order did not make 
a specific finding on whether the Defendant surety's failure to file a Form 8 change of status notice 
had been "willful" for purposes of Idaho Code § 72-604. R., pp. 81-95. Employer and Surety 
pointed out that oversight in their Motion for Reconsideration and Supporting Memorandum. R., 
pp. 107-108. In its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission did make a 
finding that Defendants' failure to submit a notice of change of status had been "willful." R., p. 
J 33. The Commission reasoned, in pertinent part, that: 
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The plain language of the statute treats the cessation or final payment of PPI 
benefits the same as other benefits, such as TTDs or medical benefits; therefore, the 
cessation of any of these benefits triggers the need for a NOCS from 
Defendants. Defendants correctly observe that the Commission did not explicitly 
find Defendants' failure to provide a NOCS to be willful. Under Idaho Code§ 72-
604, the statute of limitations for filing a claim is only tolled if the 
employer's failure to file the change of status is willful. However, such a 
finding of willfulness is implicit in our finding that the plain language of the statute 
requires a NOCS upon the cessation of any class of benefits. Therefore, 
we specifically conclude the Defendants' failure was willful as anticipated by 
Idaho Code § 72-604. 
*** 
Here, because there is no ambiguity in the plain language of statute requiring a 
NOCS when there is a cessation of benefits, Defendants' failure to submit the 
NOCS was similarly without lawful excuse and willful. 
R., pp. 132-133. 
Thus, the Commission essentially determined that the failure to file a notice of change of 
status (NOCS) at the time of the final payment of income benefits for PPI automatically 
constituted a "willful" act for purposes of the tolling provision of Idaho Code § 72-604. The 
Commission, however, failed to consider whether, under the facts of the case, there was a lawful 
excuse for the failure of Surety to file a Form 8 notice of change of status. 
This Court has recognized various legal excuses to "willful" provisions in civil statutes, 
including Idaho Code§ 72-604. By failing to assess whether "substantial compliance" with Idaho 
Code § 72-806 can constitute a lawful excuse for purposes of Idaho Code § 72-604, the 
Commission erred as a matter of law. 
In Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754,761,589 P. 2d 89, 96 (1979), the Court 
construed the term "willfully" for purposes of an unemployment law statute penalizing claimants 
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who willfully withhold a material fact in order to obtain benefits. The Court adopted the 
construction of the term "willfully" that it had utilized dating back to 1921. It stated that: 
Id. 
We may assume that when it elects to use a particular term, the legislature 
is cognizant of the meaning ascribed to that term in prior judicial decision. See C. 
Forsman Real_Estate Co. v Hatch,. 97 Idaho 511, 547 P.2d 1116 (1976). In 1955 
the legislature declared for the first time that one who willfully failed to report a 
material fact was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Ch. 18 § 9, 1955 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 20, 36. Presumably, the legislature was aware of this Court's previous 
characterization of the willfulness concept in Archibold v. Huntington, 34 Idaho 
558,201 P. 1041 (1921): 
"[Willfully] implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or 
make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, in the 
sense of having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong 
and may be distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done, in that it does 
not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with 
'intentionally,' 'designedly,' 'without lawful excuse,' and therefore not 
accidental." Id. At 565, 201 P. at 1043. 
In 1966 this Court quoted with approval the foregoing excerpt from 
Archbold in State v. Hall, 90 Idaho 478,490,413 P. 2d 685,692 (1966). Since our 
decision in Hall, the legislature has repeatedly reenacted provision penalizing 
claimants who willfully fail to report material facts in order to obtain benefits. See, 
e.g., ch 141, § 5, 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws 517,525; ch. 47, § I, 1975 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 86, 88. The legislature's presumed knowledge of our interpretations of 
willful in Archbold and Hall suggests that it intended to disqualify those claimants 
who purposely, intentionally, consciously, or knowingly fail to report a material 
fact, not those who omission is accidental because of negligence, misunderstanding 
or other cause. [Citations form other jurisdictions omitted.] 
The Court in Meyer reversed the Industrial Commission's determination that Meyer had 
refused suitable work and willfully failed to report his refusal of an employment offer from 
Skyline. Meyer had testified that he had misunderstood a question on the weekly certification 
form, and his testimony was found credible by the claim examiner; nonetheless, the examiner 
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concluded that he had willfully failed to report his refusal to work. At a second hearing following 
Meyer's appeal to the Industrial Commission, the referee prepared findings, conclusions, and an 
order, and the Commission adopted these as its own. The findings made no mention of Meyer's 
interpretation of the question regarding refusal to work. The Commission, through its referee, 
made no finding contrary to the claims examiner's finding that Meyer had misunderstood the 
question. The Court reversed the Commission because the Court thought "it likely that the 
commission, like the appeals examiner, based its conclusion of willful withholding upon the notion 
that Meyer must be held to know that which he should have known through the exercise of minimal 
care. In effect, then, the commission may have assumed that the willfulness requirement was 
satisfied by gross negligence on Meyer's part." 99 Idaho at 761,589 P.2d at 96. 
In 1984, the Court in Smith v. Department of Employment, 107 Idaho 625,628,691 P. 2d 
1240, 1243 (1984), applied the construction of "willful" it had articulated in Meyer and reversed 
the Commission's determination that Claimant had willfully failed to report the number of hours 
worked for the week claimed. Smith had not reported extra hours which he had volunteered and 
for which he had not been compensated. He had relied on the definition of "bona fide work" 
contained in the Department of Employment's booklet "Facts About Your Unemployment 
Insurance." The definition read, "Work performed by an employee for an employer and for which 
remuneration was received." Since Smith had received no compensation for the extra hours he 
received, he felt he didn't need to report them. He was not aware that the total hours worked, 
whether gratuitous or not, was a "material fact" which needed to be reported because it was 
relevant to the issue of whether he was available for suitable work and seeking work. Id., at 627, 
1242. The Court held that the failure to report was not willful because "it was not 'knowing' in 
the sense that he understood the necessity of for reporting that particular act." Id. 
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The Court in Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 111 Idaho 79, 721 P. 2d 179 
(1986) adopted for purposes of Idaho Code § 72-604's "willfully fails or refuses to file" 
requirement the construction of "willful" it had articulated in Meyer and Smith. The claimant in 
Bainbridge had argued before the Commission that the statute of limitation for filing her 
occupational disease claim was tolled by Idaho Code § 72-604 because the employer had "willfully 
failed" to file a report of occupational disease pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-602. The Commission 
found that the employer's failure to file was not willful. On appeal, the Court held that by its 
express terms, the tolling provision of Idaho Code § 72-604 did not apply to Idaho Code § 72-448, 
which is the statute of limitation for occupational disease claims. The Court, however, went ahead 
to hypothetically address the "willful" issue raised by claimant "[e]ven if §72-604 were applicable 
to §72-448[.]" The Court commented that the note from claimant's physician which she had 
presented to the employer: 
contains no specific language indicating that claimant's underlying condition was 
caused by her work environment. Employer's failure to draw from the note an 
inference to the contrary (i.e., that claimant's asthma was caused by her work 
environment) is at most a simple misunderstanding of Dr. McConnel's intent in 
issuing the note. Any subsequent failure to file the §72-602(1) report would be 
based on that misunderstanding. As we indicated in Smith v. State Dept. of 
Employment, supra, misunderstanding or otherwise negligent omission to report 
required information will not support a finding that such an omission or failure to 
report is "willful." 107 Idaho at 628, 691 P.2d at 1243, quoting Meyer v Skyline 
Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754,761,589 P.2nd 89, 96 (1979). 
lll ldahoat82-3, 721 P. 2dat 182-3. 
Thus, as indicated by the above case law, such things as "negligence" or "other cause" can 
negate a finding of "willfulness." The Court, however, has not articulated a comprehensive list of 
all causes that can constitute "other cause" sufficient to excuse the failure to file a report required 
by one of the statutes referenced in Idaho Code § 72-604. But its decision in Poss v. Meeker 
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Machine Shop, 109 Idaho 921, 925, 712 P. 2d 621, 626 (1985) implies that substantial 
compliance with Idaho Code § 72-806 may be such an "other cause." Consequently, the 
Commission erred by failing to consider whether "substantial compliance" with Idaho Code § 72-
806 constitutes a cause sufficient to legally excuse the failure to file a Form 8 notice of change of 
status. 
D. Substantial Compliance with Idaho Code § 72-806 is Legally Sufficient to Excuse for 
Purposes of the Tolling Provision of Idaho Code § 72-604 the Surety's Failure to File 
a Form 8 at the Time of the Final Payment of Income Benefits for Claimant's 
Permanent Impairment Rating 
In Poss v. Meeker Machine Shop, supra, Poss argued before the Commission that the surety 
violated Idaho Code §72-806 because it stopped paying medical benefits following a panel 
examination and did not provide written notice to Poss or his physician within 15 days that medical 
expenses were being terminated. The Commission ruled against Poss and the Court affirmed, 
noting that "It is apparent from the record that Argonaut did, in fact, notify Dr. Cipriano when it 
forwarded to him a copy of the first medical panel's report which contained that panel's 
recommendations." Thus, the Court implicitly recognized that a technical violation of Idaho Code 
§ 72-806 by failing to provide a written notice of change of status can be excused by substantial 
compliance with the statute-Le., by providing to a relevant person the information that would be 
contained on a written notice of change of status. 
Subsequent to the decision in Poss, the Commission, at least once, applied the concept of 
substantial compliance to excuse a technical violation of Idaho Code § 72-806. In Dempewolf v. 
T & H Investments, Inc., 1990 IIC 0859 (11/14/1990),3 the surety's adjuster received a panel report 
3 For convenience of the Court, a copy of the Dempewolf opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A. Interestingly, 
the Commission did not cite Dempewolf or Poss in either its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
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and sent claimant's counsel a letter and copy of the report seven days later. [For the convenience 
of the Court, a copy of the Dempewolf decision is attached hereto as an Appendix.] He told counsel 
that the panel had concluded that claimant's condition was fixed and stable and the he could return 
to work. He also told counsel he could call if he had any question. During a phone conversation 
with counsel, the adjuster told counsel that total temporary disability benefits would 
cease. Counsel informed the adjuster that written notice was required by statute concerning 
termination or change of benefits and oral notice was not enough. Counsel filed a complaint, 
seeking additional TTD benefits. He alleged, in part, that he was entitled to further TTD until 
written notice was given pursuant to Section 72-806. The referee rejected claimant's argument 
and the Commission agreed. The referee first noted that "Claimant next argues that he is entitled 
to total temporary disability benefits after December 14, 1989 until proper written notice is given 
pursuant to J.C. Sec. 72-806." 1990 IIC 0859 at p. 9. The referee then quoted the text of the statute, 
went on to state: 
According to this section, when a surety wishes to terminate a claimant's 
benefits, the surety must: (1) follow the Commission's rules about who shall give 
notice and in what form; (2) give notice in writing; and (3) attach a copy of the 
medical report if the termination of benefits is based on a medical report. According 
to Commission regulation IDAPA 17.01.03.806, adopted October 10, 1978, the 
surety, in this case was required to mail the change of benefits or status notice to 
the claimant within ten days of change of status or condition along with a copy of 
the medical report. 
A copy of the panel's medical report was sent to claimant in care of his attorney 
on January 29, 1990, within ten days of receipt of the report. The cover letter did 
not state that benefits were being terminated, but that claimant was fixed and stable 
and there was no impairment and that claimant could return to work. The fact that 
March 26, 2018 or its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration of May 23, 2018. The Commission has never 
overruled Dempewolf. 
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benefits were being terminated was communicated orally to claimant's counsel. 
Therefore, technically, defendant surety did violate the statute. 
The Referee concludes, nevertheless, that defendant surety substantially 
complied with the requirements of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
in Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 109 Idaho 920, 712 P.2d 621 (1985). In Poss, the 
Supreme Court examined Section 72-806's notice requirements. Claimant's 
benefits were terminated when the surety received the results of the panel 
examination. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission finding that defendant 
surety did not act unreasonably in terminating the payment of medical benefits by 
sending claimant's doctor a copy of the panel report containing the panel's 
recommendations. In the instant case, defendant surety received a copy of the 
panel's report on January 22, 1990. The report was then sent to claimant's counsel 
with a cover letter stating claimant was fixed and stable and could return to work. 
It should have been obvious to counsel that the period of recovery was over, and 
the claimant was no longer entitled to total temporary disability benefits. Therefore, 
the Referee finds defendant surety substantially complied with I.C. Section 72-806 
and that, coupled with oral notification of termination of benefits, claimant had 
actual notice of the change of status in workers' compensation benefits. The 
Referee finds Poss dispositive of this issue. Consequently, claimant is not entitled 
to total temporary disability benefits from December 14, 1989 to April 9, 1990. 
1990 IIC 0859 at p. l 0. 
Poss and Dempewolf implicitly recognize that the policy underlying Idaho Code§ 72-806 
is to provide information to a claimant regarding his/her benefits so that he/she will not be 
prejudiced and can talce subsequent action to obtain additional benefits. Logically, that is why a 
technical violation of Idaho Code §72-806 can be excused by substantial compliance. Poss is 
authority which supports "substantial compliance" with Section 72-806 as the type of case which 
should be regarded by the Court as legally sufficient to negate a finding of "willful" under Idaho 
Code § 72-604. Because the Commission did not apply the legal standard of "substantial 
compliance" to the stipulated and undisputed facts, it committed reversible error and must be 
reversed. 
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Because there were no witnesses which appeared before the Commission and because the 
case was submitted to the Commission on stipulated facts, the Court should apply the "substantial 
compliance" standard to those facts rather than remand the case to the Commission. 
Employer and Surety contend that the Statement attached to the final PPI payment check 
contained all the information that would have been contained on a Form 8 Form. There was 
nothing in the Statement to mislead either Claimant or his attorney as to the status of his benefits. 
Claimant and his attorney were aware from the notice of change of status that was issued on July 
18, 2014 following the issuance by Dr. Fellars of a permanent rating that the rating was 11 % of 
the whole person, that the total value of the rating was $18,694.50, and that it would be paid out 
in installments in bi-weekly installments based at the rate of $339.90. The Statement attached to 
the June 22, 2016 check for $2,379.30 clearly indicated that this payment was for the period from 
June 20, 2015 through July 3, 2015; that the payment was for permanent impairment; and that the 
payment was the "PPI Final Payment." Thus, Claimant and his attorney were aware that there 
would be no further payment of income benefits for permanent impairment after June 22, 2016. 
They were aware that since income benefits had been discontinued more than four years after the 
accident, Claimant was subject to the one-year limitation provision of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) 
regarding a complaint for an award of additional income benefits. Consequently, the Court should 
conclude that Surety "substantially complied" with Idaho Code § 72-806; that as a consequence 
of that "substantial compliance," the failure of Surety to issue a Form 8 Notice of Change of Status, 
which would have contained the same information provided on the Statement accompanying the 
final payment check, was not "willful" under Idaho Code § 72-604; that the statute of limitation 
of Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) was not tolled; and that Claimant's Complaint was not timely filed and 
is barred by Idaho Code § 72-706(3). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the undisputed facts of the case and the arguments herein, the Court should 
reverse the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; and should reverse 
the Commission's Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. Employer and Surety request that 
the Court order that Claimant's Complaint was not timely filed and is barred by Idaho Code§ 72-
706(3). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS .J ~ay of November, 2018. 
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Decisions or the Idaho Industrial Commission 
1990 IIC 0859.1 
11/14/1990 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Dcmpcnolf, Rocky 
T &H Investments, Inc. 
State Insurance Fund 
11/14/1990 
89-668421 - 1990 IIC 0859 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
This is a chronic back pain case. On March 7, 1990, claimant filed a Motion to Bifurcate and 
Request for Expedited Hearing simultaneously with his Application for Hearing. The motions 
were granted and Referee Peggy McMahon heard the matter in Post Falls, Idaho on May 16, 
1990. Claimant was present in person and represented by Steven C. Yerby of Sandpoint, Idaho. 
Defendants were represented by Wynne M. Blake of Randall, Blake, Cox, Risley & Trout, 
Lewiston, Idaho. Oral and documentary evidence was presented. The matter was continued 
under the rules to receive further evidence and briefs and is now ready for decision. 
ISSUES 
In claimant's Motion to Bifurcate, he asserted that the issues at hearing would be the denial of 
total temporary disability benefits and of medical benefits. He reiterated at hearing that these 
were the same issues to be heard, indicating other "policy issues" would also be involved. 
Defendants assert in their post hearing brief that the issue relating to medical benefits is not 
properly before the Commission because there was no evidence presented in the record that any 
medical bills were unpaid. The Referee concurs. Therefore, the sole issue is whether claimant 
was entitled to total temporary disability payments from December 14, 1989 (the time the panel 
found claimant was stable) until April 9, 1990 (the time claimant's physician found him stable). 
Any relevant policy issues will be treated as part of the sole issue before the Commission record. 
The record established in this case and considered by the Referee is as follows: 
1. Oral testimony of Ronald Brady, Steven R. Hammen and claimant presented at hearing; 
2. Exhibits 1, 1 A, and 2 through 18 presented at hearing; 
3. Deposition of Dr. Aleksandra Zietak taken May 7, 1990; and 
4. Stipulation received by the Commission dated July 16, 1990. 
Having considered the evidence established in the record and the arguments of counsel, Referee 
Peggy McMahon submits the following proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order which she recommends the Commission adopt as its Decision and Order. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
I 
Background 
Decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
1990 IIC 0859.2 
11/14/1990 
Claimant, Rocky Dempewolf, engaged in mill work for about two years with employer 
defendant, 
T & H Investments, Inc., a lumber remanufacturing business located in Dover, Idaho. This 39 
year-old was injured on August 28, 1989. While standing on a platform adjusting lumber on a 
chain, claimant lost his balance, the railing gave way and he fell about four feet onto a cement 
surface landing on his neck and back area. He got up, brushed himself off and went back to 
work the rest of the day. 
II 
Previous Back Injuries 
Claimant has had a series of back injuries over the past 20 years. In 1968, claimant foll from a 
porch when he was 17 years of age and suffered a low-back injury. He asserted that in the last 
eight years his lower back went out on him on an average of about once a year. In 1983 and in 
1987, he had two low-back injuries which resulted in brief periods of time loss from work. In 
September 1988, he again injured his thoracic spine, missing only a fow days of work. Claimant 
has not had any back surgery; treatment has been primarily chiropractic in nature. In 1988, 
claimant underwent a bilateral carpal tunnel surgery which gave him relief from wrist pain 
associated with prior injuries. In December 1989, he had been taking Percodan for two years for 
headaches. 
III 
Current Injury and Course of Treatment 
Two days after claimant's most recent injury, in August 1989, claimant felt he could not handle 
his job. He went to Dr. Richard N. Peterson, a family practitioner located in Sandpoint, Idaho. 
At that time he experienced upper-back pain thoracic and subscapular tenderness. Because 
x-rays of the thoracic and cervical spine were negative for acute injury, Dr. Peterson diah'llosed 
severe trapezius and thoracic muscle strain. Dr. Peterson advised claimant not to work and to 
undergo physical therapy. Three weeks later, September 18, 1989, claimant still suffered from 
tenderness and moderate subscapular area spasm. Dr. Peterson recommended continued physical 
therapy and referred claimant to a Sandpoint orthopedic specialist, Dr. Frank Cipriano. 
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Dr. Cipriano examined claimant on October 4, 1989, and found him still primarily complaining 
of inter-scapular pain. There was tenderness present from the C6 to T5 levels. Dr. Cipriano 
diagnosed chronic cervical strain and recommended continued physical therapy and light duty 
work with no other treatment suggested. Two days later claimant returned to see Dr. Peterson. 
V 
Dr. Peterson noticed claimant had almost constant pain in varying degrees, which pain was 
aggravated by motion. Nevertheless, Dr. Peterson found no significant sprain of the paraspinous 
muscle. Claimant continued with medication. On October 13, l 989, Dr. Peterson noted there 
was no light work available. Claimant's back was still tender with moderate spasm in the 
trapezius and subscapular area. He had 80% range of motion in his neck. 
VI 
By the beginning of November 1989, two months after claimant's accident, claimant told Dr. 
Peterson his neck and shoulders were doing worse although his lower back was improving with 
the work hardening program. The mid-upper thoracic area was still tender upon examination. 
Dr. Peterson ordered an MRI and referred claimant to Dr. Aleksandra Zietak, a Spokane, 
Washington physiatrist, and to Dr. Ernest C. Fokes a Coeur d'Alene, Idaho neurosurgeon. 
VII 
Dr. Zietak first evaluated claimant on November 16, 1989. Claimant complained at that time 
that he had headaches and pain through the shoulders and down the anns, and that his lower 
back had been acting up since he had been in the work hardening program. (Claimant's initial 
physical therapy involved massage, ultrasound and heat therapy. In the three weeks preceding 
the Zietak visit, claimant began the work hardening program.) Claimant told Dr. Zietak that 
anything the therapist did involving his back made things worse. Although claimant was taking 
Soma, Flexeril and another medication, perhaps anti-inflammatory, he stated that medications 
just did not seem to work for him. He felt he did not think he was getting better. 
Upon examination, Dr. Zietak found '"trigger points" (areas which indicate muscle weakness and 
decreased tolerance for activities) throughout the neck and upper back muscles to about the T8 
level There were none in the lower back. Claimant's cervical spine range of motion was within 
normal limits, his spinal curvature was normal and all other tests were within normal limits. 
After examining claimant and reviewing the MRI of the thoracic spinal cord, Dr. Zietak noted 
that she doubted the MRI findings were related to c1aimant's symptoms because of the disc 
herniation location and the lack of trigger points in those areas and also because of a normal 
neurological examination. 
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Dr. Zietak recommended continued work hardening and contacted claimant's therapist for 
continued treatment. She also opined, "I am concerned that there are a number of psychological 
issues that are impeding recovery ... " Ex. 3. She listed claimant's previous workers' 
compensation claim, dissatisfaction with his employer, present retention of an attorney, and his 
wife's and daughter's involvement in a car accident with possible litigation. She recommended 
an MMPI but claimant was reluctant to follow through. 
VIII 
Before consulting with Dr. Fokes, claimant returned to Dr. Zietak for a follow-up visit on 
December 6, 1989. Claimant brought the results of November 27, 1989 MRI studies of the 
cervical lumbar spine which Dr. Zietak reviewed. The findings disclosed a small annular bulge 
at C3-4 of doubtful clinical significance, a herniated nucleus pulposus at C6-7 and an annular 
bulge with possible ostcophytic ridging of the CS-6. Dr. Zictak examined the claimant again and 
found he had improved objectively. His trigger points continued, although not as prominently. 
Claimant complained that he was not any better. 
Dr. Zietak contacted Steve Heinrich, claimant's physical therapist, who stated that claimant 
would not allow him to advance in the exercise pro!,YTam. Dr. Zietak concluded that while 
claimant had improved objectively, there was no subjective change. She told the claimant and 
his wife he had chronic pain syndrome; she explained the mechanism of muscular injury, disc 
herniation and chronic pain. Dr. Zietak testified that she explained to claimant that the multiple 
herniated discs were "not as horrible as they sounded" because disc herniations do not 
necessarily cause pain without nerve root involvement. Dr. Zietak noted that the claimant 
"remains very focused on a lot of extraneous issues which makes be believe the chronic pain 
syndrome is the main problem." Her plan was to pursue a psychological evaluation and/or a 
pain clinic if surgery was not recommended. she finally noted, "this certainly is a challenging 
case." Dr. Zietak's notes of December 12, 1989 indicated she planned to have claimant continue 
with work hardening, then undergo a physical capacity examination, and then look for a job. 
IX 
Claimant received a neurosurgical examination by Dr. Fokes on December 12, I 989. Claimant's 
chief complaint again was pain between his shoulder blades and in the low back. He also 
complained of pain in his neck. Dr. Fokes noted: 
ON EXAMINATION TODAY HE WALKS WITH A COMFORTABLE GAIT AND SHOWS NO 
EVIDENCE OF DISTRESS. I NOTED THAT HE WAS ABLE TO RATHER SPRING FROM 
THE EXAMINING TABLE TO Tl IE FLOOR. 
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Exhibit 13. After reviewing the MRI scans and examining claimant, Dr. Fokes concluded 
claimant had a calcified disc protrusion at D9, l 0 which was of no clinical significance 
currently. He opined the other discs were likewise of no clinical significance and probably not 
related to his current complaints. Dr. Fokes recommended at most a vigorous work hardening 
program of one month, which claimant informed he was undergoing, Dr. Fokes did not find 
claimant suffered from any neurosurgical problem and recommended continued conservative 
treatment. 
X 
Two days later, on December 14, 1989, claimant underwent a panel examination by Dr. Scott V. 
Linder, a Spokane orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Patrick Lynch, a Spokane neurosurgeon. Again, 
claimant presented with burning pain in the upper back and neck area and aching pain 
throughout the mid- and low-back. He also had headaches and pain in the left elbow and hand. 
Claimant also reported that Dr. Zietak recommended surgery and that Dr. Fokes suggested it 
might be necessary. 
The panel examined claimant and did not find any spasm, abnormal range of motion or 
abnormal lordotic curve. In all respects the examination was nonnal. There were no limitations 
of motion or abnormal neurologic findings, except that claimant did have very minimal 
tenderness on deep palpation in the T2 to T6 area. The panelists also reviewed the MRI scans. 
They diagnosed claimant as having chronic cervical and thoracic strain syndrome due to his 
industrial accident of August 28, 1989, which was resolved. They also diagnosed claimant's 
preexisting chronic low-back pain as having been aggravated but also resolved. It was the 
panelists' opinion that claimant's condition was fixed and stable. They believed he had ample 
physical therapy (approximately four months) and encouraged him to continue exercising on a 
self-directed basis. They reported that claimant, by his own estimation, was then presently lifting 
and working with approximately as much weight in his work hardening program as he would at 
work, so they felt the purpose of the work hardening program was substantially accomplished. 
They felt claimant could complete the work hardening program and work at the same time 
because the program only involved about four and a half hours a week. They did not impose any 
physical restrictions on him and did not relate any of his low-back problems to his August 28, 
1989 injury. It was their opinion he could return to work without restrictions. However, in view 
of the MRI findings, they felt it appropriate to limit the weight he lifted to 40 to 50 pounds. 
They felt no further studies were necessary. 
XI 
Notes from claimants physical therapist, Steve Heinrich of Kootenai Physical Therapy Center in 
Sandpoint, indicate that therapy began on September 6, 1989 and was to occur three times a 
week for three to six weeks as needed. The goals were to decrease pain, improve se1:,rmental 
mobility and return claimant to work as soon as possible. Claimant underwent 11 sessions in 
September. 
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Mr. Heinrich reported to Dr. Peterson on October 4, 1989, that claimant was showing slow 
progress. In October, claimant had 12 sessions, beginning with work hardening on the 19th. 
Heinrich reported to Dr. Peterson on December 8, 1989, that claimants follow through was good 
although claimant initially tolerated the upper body workout poorly. After resuming both the 
upper and lower body workout, claimant progressed from weights of 20 to 30 pounds up to 40 to 
50 pounds on most activities. Claimant attended only eight sessions in December due to other 
family problems and transportation difficulties. On Deceiver 21, 1989, Heinrich reported that 
claimant was pushing himself at work hardening and was seeing nice increases in his upper body 
and lower body strength. Heinrich stated that the emphasis from then on would be on 
management with a goal of returning to full function. After seven more sessions in January, 
claimant completed the work hardening program on January 18, 1990. Previously on January 5, 
1990, Mr. Heinrich noted that claimant was upset with Dr. Zietak's report and felt it portrayed 
him in an unfair light. Heinrich felt the report was accurate overall except for minor 
discrepancies. 
XII 
Claimant continued to sec Dr. Peterson throughout January and February 1990. Dr. Peterson did 
not release claimant to heavy work and noted no light duty work was available. Claimant 
reported he was about the same and was unable to work. Dr. Peterson arranged for a physical 
capacity assessment. 
XIII 
Laurie Brunette, RPT of the Department of Rehabilitative Services at Kootenai Medical Center, 
performed a standard functional capacities assessment of claimant on March 7 and 8, 1990. Ms. 
Brunette reported that claimant viewed only 22 minutes of the educational videotape 
presentation and stopped looking after that point. She found that the values for lifting (25 
pounds) and weight carry (30 pounds) represent the level claimant was willing to perfonn 
"within his perceived pain tolerance rather than safe maximum levels." Exhibit 1. She further 
reported that claimant limited himself on 40% of the test items due to reported and perceived 
pain between his shoulder blades, in his neck and lowback. Ms. Brunette recommended claimant 
work on an exercise probrram similar to those he had done at work hardening. However, 
claimant said he did not have the Nautilus equipment -- although he had weights he never used 
them. She also recommended he could benefit from flexibility and cardiovascular conditioning 
as we all would. There were no significant strength or range of motion deficits. She also 
recommended claimant quit smoking. She felt he had sufficient physical therapy to maximize 
his physical recovery and believed he might benefit from a psychosocial referral. On her return 
to work statement she concluded: 
Due to client's self-limitation of activities, a return lo work statement based 011 muscoloskeletal 
abilities is 1101 possible. The cliellt stopped acth•ities due to perceived pain in the mid back, low 
hack, and neck. and maximum safe values could 1101 be established. 
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Id. Nevertheless she recommended that claimant be returned to a job within the capabilities 
demonstrated during the test procedure. 
XIV 
In the interim, Dr. Peterson moved to California. Dr. Franz Siemsen, Dr. Peterson's office 
associate, infonned claimant on March 15, 1990, he did not feel qualified to provide claimant 
medical care. Claimant then returned to Dr. Zietak on April 9, 1990, seeking a referral to a 
physician. He shared the results of functional capacities assessment with Dr. Zietak. Claimant 
was not examined at that time. Dr. Zietak gave claimant a release to work with restrictions that 
he not lift more than IO pounds frequently or 30 pounds occasionally. He could occasionally 
bend, squat, stoop, reach over-head, push and pull, but not sit, stand or walk more than a half 
hour at a single time each. Dr. Zietak testified by way of deposition that the original goal of 
physical therapy was to have claimant lift 60 to 70 pounds. She was aware claimant was lifting 
between 40 to 50 pounds and he told the panelists he could lift 50 to 60 pounds. She was also 
aware that claimant did not try as hard and he could have on the functional capacities 
assessment. However, it was her opinion that his mental capacities as well as his physical 
capacities had to be taken into account. It was also her opinion that claimant had not reached 
maximum medical stability on December 6, 1989 (claimant's follow-up visit) although he had 
improved somewhat objectively. She testified she recommended physical therapy for several 
more weeks. The Referee does not find Dr. Zietak's opinion regarding maximum medical 
stability persuasive in light of all the facts. See analysis in Conclusions of Law Ill and IV, supra. 
xv 
Notice of Termination ofTTDs 
Kevin Arps, adjuster for defendant surety, received a copy of the panel report on January 22, 
I 990. He then sent claimant's counsel a letter dated January 29, 1990, indicating that the 
panelists concluded claimant's condition was fixed and stable and that he could return to work. 
He enclosed a copy of the panel results and added that if counsel had any questions, he could 
contact Mr. Arps at his office phone which he listed. During a phone conversation, Mr. Arps 
told claimant's counsel that claimant's total temporary disability benefits would cease. 
Claimant's counsel informed Mr. Arps on March 6, 1990 that written notification was required 
by statute concerning termination or change of benefits and oral notice was not enough. 
XIV 
Medical Benefits 
There was no evidence presented at hearing that any of claimant's medical bills were denied or 
remained unpaid. Therefore, the Referee finds that there is no issue at this time regarding 
claimant's entitlement to medical benefits or for attorney fees for unreasonable denial of medical 
benefits. 
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Claimant suffered an industrial accident and injury on August 28, 1989 while employed by 
defendant employer T & H Investments, Inc. 
II 
Claimant was paid total temporary disability benefits (TTDs) up to the time he was examined by 
the panelists on December 14, 1989. The sole issue before the Commission is whether claimant 
is entitled to TTDs from December 14, 1989 through April 9, 1990, the date when Dr. Zietak 
released claimant for work. I.C. Sec. 72-408 and Sec. 72-422 indicate that injured workers, 
while totally or partially temporarily disabled, arc entitled to income benefits during a .. period of 
recovery" until "maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and .. . is considered stable 
or nonpro!:,rrcssive at the time of evaluation." The burden is on the claimant to present expert 
medical opinion evidence of the extent and duration of his disability in order to recover income 
benefits for such disability. Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761,763,605 P.2d 939,941 
( 1980). 
Ill 
The facts relative to claimant's accident and injury are essentially undisputed. Claimant suffered 
no acute injury does not need surgery and has no obvious abnormalities except for herniated 
discs revealed by the MRI scans. The panelists, as well as Dr. Zietak and Dr. Fokes, all stated 
that the herniated discs are not related to claimant's complaints. Instead, claimant suffered from 
muscle strain of the upper back and aggravated his preexisting low-back pain condition. 
Moreover, claimant's physical condition improved after his August 1989 accident. Claimant's 
cervical range of motion, which was 80% on October 4, 1989, pro!:,rressed to I 00% on December 
6, 1989. Dr. Zietak agreed with the panel that claimant's range of motion was within normal 
limits. Additionally, claimant's ability to lift weights progressed as he continued his physical 
therapy and work hardening. He was lifting 40 to 50 pounds by December 6 and reported to the 
panelists on December 14, 1989, that he could lift 50 to 60 pounds. Dr. Zietak believed he could 
increase that amount to 60 to 70 pounds in two to four more weeks of work hardening. 
IV 
Claimant, however, did not attempt to reach that goal. As Dr. Zietak stated in December 1989, 
while claimant had progressed nicely objectively, subjectively he had not. First, claimant 
stopped doing weight exercises in the work hardening and therapy program. By December 6, 
1988, claimant's lack of subjective pro1:,rression was obvious. Claimant did not focus on Dr. 
Zietak's explanation of his pain syndrome but rather remained focused on extraneous issues. 
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He did not want to undergo an MMPI. About a week later on December 14, 1989, claimant 
erroneously reported to the panelists that his physical condition was one that required surgery 
even though no one had recommended it. There were no significant documented physical 
changes between the panel examination in mid-December 1989 and the functional capacities 
assessment on March 7, 8 and 9, 1990. At that time, claimant stopped watching the educational 
videotape presentation, limited himself on 40% of the test items due to perceived back pain, and 
indicated that while he had weights at home, he never used them. Maximum safe values could 
not be established. 
The Referee concludes that claimant has not met his burden of presenting medical evidence that 
he reached maximum medical rehabilitation on April 9, 1990. Rather, in considering the 
evidence as a whole, the weight of the evidence shows that claimant reached his maximal 
medical rehabilitation on December 14, I 989 when the panel considered him fixed and stable 
and able to work. After that point, no more healing or strengthening could be anticipated. There 
was no physical change in his condition. The only change was in his attitude and unwillingness 
to try. That change had occurred by December 14, 1989 and continued up through March 7, 
1990. Consequently, the Referee concludes that claimant is not entitled to total temporary 
disability benefits from December 14, 1989 through April 9, 1990. 
V 
Claimant argues extensively about .. public policy" reasons why treating physicians should make 
treatment decisions rather than doctors hired by the surety. He states that the surety should first 
be required to prove to the Commission that the treating physician's care is unreasonable, 
pursuant to I.C. Section 72-432, before the surety can have another physician examine a 
claimant. Such is clearly not the law in Idaho. J.C. Section 72-433( l ), entitled "Submission of 
injured employee to medical examination or physical rehabilitation," provides in pertinent part: 
After an i11jwy . . . and during the period of disability the employee. if reque.\·te,I by tire employer 
or ordered by the commission, shall submit himself for examination at reasonable lime and 
places to a duly qualified physician or surgeon . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the change advocated by claimant is legislative in nature and not 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission in the instant case. 
VI 
Claimant next argues that he is entitled to total temporary disability benefits after December 14, 
1989 until proper written notice is given pursuant to I.C. Sec. 72-806. That section provides: 
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A workman shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change ofstatu.s or 
condition including, but not limited to, the denial, reduction or cessation of medical and/or 
monetmy compensation benefits, which directly or indirect~v affects the level of compensation 
benefits to which he might presently or 11/timate/y be entitled. ff ,my change in compensation 
henefits is based 11po11 a medical report or medical repor!sfrom any physician or any other 
practitioner of the healing arts, a copy of sud, report shall be attached lo the written nolice 
which the workman shall receive. The industrial commission shall by rule and regulation, 
determine by whom the notice shall be given and the form for such notice. In the absence of a 
rule governing a particular situation, the employer's insurer, or in the case ofself-in.rnrers, the 
employer, shall he rcsponsihlefor giving the notice required herein. 
According to this section, when a surety wishes to terminate a claimant's benefits, the surety 
must: (I) follow the Commission's rules about who shall give notice and in what form; (2) give 
notice in writing; and (3) attach a copy of the medical report if the tennination of benefits is 
based on a medical report. According to Commission regulation IDAPA 17.01.03.806, adopted 
October I 0, 1978, the surety, in this case was required to mail the change of benefits or status 
notice to the claimant within ten days of change of status or condition along with a copy of the 
medical report. 
A copy of the panel's medical report was sent to claimant in care of his attorney on January 29, 
1990, within ten days of receipt of the report. The cover letter did not state that benefits were 
being terminated, but that claimant was fixed and stable and there was no impainncnt and that 
claimant could return to work. The fact that benefits were being tenninated was communicated 
orally to claimant's counsel. Therefore, technically, defendant surety did violate the statute. 
The Referee concludes, nevertheless, that defendant surety substantially complied with the 
requirements of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 
109 Idaho 920, 712 P .2d 621 ( 1985). In Poss, the Supreme Court examined Section 72-806's 
notice requirements. Claimant's benefits were terminated when the surety received the results of 
the panel examination. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission finding that defendant 
surety did not act unreasonably in terminating the payment of medical benefits by sending 
claimant's doctor a copy of the panel report containing the panel's recommendations. In the 
instant case, defendant surety received a copy of the panel's report on January 22, 1990. The 
report was then sent to claimant's counsel with a cover letter stating claimant was fixed and 
stable and could return to work. It should have been obvious to counsel that the period of 
recovery was over and the claimant was no longer entitled to total temporary disability benefits. 
Therefore, the Referee finds defendant surety substantially complied with LC. Section 72-806 
and that, coupled with oral notification of termination of benefits, claimant had actual notice of 
the change of status in workers' compensation benefits. The Referee finds Poss dispositive of 
this issue. Consequently, claimant is not entitled to total temporary disability benefits from 
December 14, 1989 to April 9, 1990. 
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That does not mean to say, however, that the Commission sanctions such conduct. Industrial 
Commission Form 8 has specifically been designed to give notice of a change of status, the type 
of change and the reasons why. Repeated failure to use this fonn properly may result in the 
insurer's change of status by the Commission. 
VII 
The Referee concludes there is no issue concerning denial of medical expenses. 
VIII 
Claimant asserts for the first time at the briefing stage that he is entitled to attorney fees because 
his benefits were tcnninated in violation of the statute and against the advice of the treating 
physician. Claimant did not list attorney fees as an issue on his Application for Hearing, on his 
Request for Calendaring or as an issue to be determined at the beginning of hearing. Therefore, 
claimant is not entitled to attorney fees. Even if he had properly pied the issue, the Referee 
would still conclude claimant would not be entitled to attorney fees because there was no 
unreasonable termination of benefits by violating a statute. (See Conclusions of Law Vil, supra.) 
Moreover, there has not been an unreasonable denial of benefits due and owing because the 
Referee has concluded there were no total temporary disability benefits due and owing beyond 
December 14, 1989. 
IX 
The Referee recommends that the Commission enter the following order. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that claimant is not entitled to additional total temporary disability 
benefits beyond December 14, 1989. Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees. 
DATED and FILED THIS 7th day of November, 1990. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl Peggy McMahon 
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The Commission has reviewed the record and the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order and hereby approves and confinns the same, and adopts them as the decision and 
order of the Commission. 
DA TED and FILED this 14th day of November, 1990. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl Will S. Defenbach 
/s/ Logan Lanham 
CODED AGE:39 
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